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ARTICLES

THE TREATMENT OF HARD CASES IN AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE: IN DEFENSE OF
DISCRETIONARY WAIVER
FRANKLIN

E.

ZIMRING*

Every state in the federal union provides special treatment
in juvenile or family courts to young persons accused of
crimes.' At the same time, every state makes some provisions
for the trial of offenders under eighteen in criminal courts in
special cases. 2 The responsibility for deciding when juvenile
court jurisdiction will be waived and young offenders transferred to a criminal court is variously distributed among prosecutors, judges, and state legislatures.' But the substantive
question does not vary: When is it appropriate to treat the subjects of the juvenile justice system charged with serious
offenses as if they were adults and banish them to prison for
long terms? To put the matter less charitably: When are
juveniles not juveniles?
In most states, the law provides that individuals under the
jurisdictional maximum age of the juvenile court can be
"waived" from that court to the full rigors of criminal court
jurisdiction and adult punishment at the discretion of ajuvenile
court judge. The prosecutor usually files a petition or makes a
motion in juvenile court to be decided by a juvenile court
judge. If the juvenile court declines jurisdiction, the defendant
is subject to prosecution in criminal court. This practice,
widely criticized, has been under sustained attack for fifteen
S Professor of Law and Director, Earl Warren
University of California at Berkeley School of Law.
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years in the United States from both liberals and
conservatives. 4
This paper argues that discretionary waiver, with all its
faults, is superior to alternative methods of handling juvenile
justice's hardest "hard cases" and suggests some basic reforms
in the standards for waiver. First, this paper examines the reasons why waiver might be the least harmful response to exceptionally severe youth crimes. It reviews three alternatives to
the waiver system which propose to deal with "hard cases."
The second part discusses some substantive and procedural
changes necessary to elicit a set of principles to be applied
when considering waiver, a critical legal decision now unguided
by coherent substantive rules. The juvenile justice system's
treatment of these hard cases presents its most significant test,
and, as this paper concludes, a well-developed and administered waiver program provides a solution.
I.

WAIVER AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

The argument for waiver rests on two important assump-

tions. First, the modem juvenile court is preferable to the
criminal justice system for the vast majority of young offenders
under seventeen or eighteen years old. Second, it is inevitable,
where the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to ages seventeen
or eighteen, that cases will arise where the minimum punitive
response believed necessary by the court and the community
exceeds that available to the juvenile court.
In any era, to say nothing of our age of declining confidence in the rehabilitative ideal, 5 strong measures must be
taken in cases where police officers are killed, elderly widows
raped, and eight-year-old girls molested and strangled by
offenders under the normal age of the adult courts' jurisdiction. These are not typical cases; they occur infrequently. But
one cannot evade the responsibility for dealing with such cases
simply by documenting their rarity. They happen. They place
4. See generally Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 487-99 (1987). Compare, e.g.. INsTrrTrE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION &
AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION,

JUVENILE

JUSTICE

STANDARDS:

STANDARDS

RELATING TO JUVENILE DEINOUENCY AND SANCTIONS (1980) with Kuh, Dissent,
in CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 21-24 (1978)
[hereinafter CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME].
5. See generally F. ALLEN, THE DECUNE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
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extraordinary strains on the assumptions, processes, and credibility of juvenile justice.
The existence of these cases requires that any balanced
discussion of waiver include an analysis of its alternatives. Discretionary waiver by the juvenile court is only one of many possible systemic adjustments to the "hard cases" that threaten the
mission and the credibility of the juvenile court. A review of
existing juvenile justice policies and current proposals for their
reform suggests three distinct strategies that could supplant
waiver: (1) increasing the punishment and incapacitation
power of the juvenile court; (2) lowering the maximum age for
juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction in general; or (3) pass- ing legislation that makes criminal court jurisdiction necessary
for stipulated categories of offenses and offenders.
All three strategies have been tried, alone or in combination, in various American jurisdictions. The substantial social
costs involved in each of these alternatives to waiver provide
the principal justification for arguing that refining and
reforming discretionary waiver is the least bad response.
1. IncreasingJuvenile Court Sanctions
One obvious reason why cases arise in which the minimum
appropriate punishment exceeds the dispositional authority of
juvenile courts is their limited power to punish. Every juvenile
justice system can subject convicted delinquents to secure confinement, but the maximum duration of confinement permitted
is much shorter than that provided for serious offenses in adult
courts. For example, prior to 1976, a juvenile offender convicted in the New York Familj, Court could spend no more than
eighteen months in secure confinement as a direct result of a
delinquency finding and commitment order.' In 1976, the leg6. See New York Family Court Act § 756b (McKinney 1975). Other
statutes typically confer authority on juvenile courts to make commitments
that theoretically could extend to the age of majority. Surveys of the actual
lengths of commitments report mean stays of six to eight months. The effect
of short and administratively determined sentence frames on plea negotiation
and sanctioning patterns appears to be profound. Whereas many sentence
negotiations in criminal courts focus on the amount of time that is to be
served, that issue is less important in juvenile court than the question of
whether or not a delinquency finding will result in postadjudicatory
confinement.
This speculation is consistent with (i) the lower
postadjudication commitment rates found in juvenile courts, (2) the higher
use of probation in juvenile court systems after conviction, and (3) the
relatively high ratio of pretrial detention to posttrial commitment observed in
many juvenile justice systems. Unfortunately, this pattern also indicates that
pretrial detention is frequently used in cases where postadjudicatory

270

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

islature amended the Family Court Act to provide for extended
periods of custodial confinement for juveniles found to be
"designated felons." The purpose of this legislation was to
make available, within a family court system that has a maximum jurisdictional age of fifteen, sentencing options that were
openly directed at retribution,
incapacitation, and deterrence
7
for extremely serious crimes.
This legislation is an excellent illustration of the substantial costs of expanding the punitive power of juvenile courts in
response to a very small number of exceptional cases, an egregious example of letting the tail wag the dog. Only a minuscule
number of delinquents under sixteen require such large doses
of social control. - Retaining them in the juvenile justice system
creates the sort of dissonance suggested by the contrast
between the terms "designated felon" and "family court." The
problem is not solely linguistic. The sending of a fifteen-yearold away for five years is almost never in the offender's best
interests, and thus requires operating at cross-purposes with
the court's purported role. Moreover, although the same
might be said of any extended period of secure confinement,
the difference between eighteen months and five years in an
adolescent's life is not just quantitative: a five-year sentence
very nearly destroys a teen-aged offender's life chances, an
impact qualitatively different from the limited destruction
wrought by the ordinary maximum terms awarded by juvenile
courts. 9

Increasing the punishment power of juvenile courts also
puts substantial pressure on their usual procedures for factfinding. The informality, nonentitlement to trial by jury, and
discretionary character of the juvenile justice system have been
defended from constitutional attack on the grounds that the
primary mission of the juvenile court is not to punish but to
confinement will not result.

For a discussion of punitive detention, see

Zimring, Background Paper,in CONFRONTING YOUTs CRIME, supra note 4, at 8889.
7. See Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 878,
§ 753a as amended by the Juvenile Justice Reform Amendment of 1978, 1978
N.Y. Laws, ch. 478.
8. See generaUy Zimring, Youth Homicide in New York: A PreliminaryAnalysis,
13J. LEGAL STUDIES 81 (1984).

9. At the time of the 1974 LEAA Census of Juvenile Facilities, the
average stay in a juvenile training school was 239 days. See LEAA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY:

JUVENILE DETENTION

ADVANCE REPORT ON THE

AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES CENSUS OF

1975 (1977).
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serve the young people who appear before it.' ° This defense of
the system troubles many who regard the disposition of the
juvenile cases as being motivated, at least in part, by the traditional purposes of punishment. The lack of traditional legal
safeguards in juvenile courts becomes far more questionable
when the court "designates" its clients as "felons" and then
locks them away for periods of time that can only be ascribed to
retributive,. incapacitative, and deterrent agendas. The
processes of contemporary juvenile justice are too frail to be
associated with drastic sanctions; a substantial argument can be
made that the couplings of severe sanctions with procedural
informality is unconstitutional.
Thus, if extraordinary procedural protections are to be
required for hard cases, either the entire juvenile justice system
must be refashioned to accommodate the demands of a few
cases, or special institutional arrangements will have to establish a form of criminal court within the juvenile court."I
Even if such adjustments are made, expanding the punishment power of juvenile courts may not defuse the pressures
building for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. In 1978, two years
after the passage of New York's "designated felon" provisions,
that state's governor proposed and its legislature passed legislation lowering the age of criminal responsibility to fourteen
(and in one instance to thirteen) for twelve felonies.' 2 This legislation mandates the transfer of all such cases to the criminal
courts. Among other things, the 1978 legislation was a reaction to a celebrated homicide for which the offender could
10. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971)
(plurality opinion).
11. The establishment of a "two-track" system within the juvenile court
would require that prosecutors or judges within the juvenile court make the
same kind of sorting decision between the high-stakes formal adjudication
and the lower-stakes informal adjudication; there is thus a disturbing
resemblance to waiver. If expanded punishment power in the juvenile court
is viewed as a total displacement of waiver, this expanded and specialized
jurisdiction would merely transplant functions now performed by the
criminal court into the juvenile court's criminal court analogue. If, as is the
case in New York, "designated felon" procedures within the juvenile court
and waiver referrals to the criminal courts coexist, a three-track system is
created. The hierarchical relationship in punishment between the three
tracks is not obvious: in practice, designated felons within the Family Court
could receive higher levels of punishment than imposed for the same offense
committed by an offender who is waivered to the criminal courts.
12. See Juvenile Justice Reform Amendment of 1978, 1978 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 478.
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receive only the maximum five years provided in the 1976
legislation."3
2.

Decreases in JurisdictionalAge

Most of the extremely serious crimes that come under the
jurisdiction ofjuvenile courts are clustered in the later years of
court jurisdiction: every year more sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds are arrested for crimes of violence than persons
For this reason, one obvious method of
under sixteen."
reducing the number of hard cases confronted by juvenile
courts is to reduce the maximum age of their jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, this too is only a partial solution: extreme violence, while rather uncommon, still occurs often enough
among thirteen- and fifteen-year-olds to constitute a formidable political problem. Nationally, in 1975, the FBI reported
over 400 arrests for criminal homicide by persons between the
ages of thirteen and fifteen. 1 5 One would thus have to cut the
jurisdictional age of the juvenile court back to twelve to deal
comprehensively with hard cases. Such a drastic reduction in
the general jurisdictional age to accommodate the problems
raised by rare acts of serious violence would be overbroad in
the extreme, a response with profound negative consequences.
In a large juvenile justice system, reducing the jurisdictional
age by even one year will sweep thousands of adolescents into
criminal courts.' 6 Nine out of ten will be accused of property
crimes; ninety-nine out of every 100 accused teen-aged felons
will be transferred to criminal courts for offenses that would
otherwise not result in waiver.'I This represents a retreat, on a
very broad front, from the principles of the juvenile court.
13.

See Boy, 15, Who Killed Two and Tried to Kill a Third, is Given Five Years,

N.Y. Times, June 29, 1978, at 1, col. 5. See also Carey, in Shift, Backs Trial in
Adult Courtfor Some Juveniles, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1978 at 1, col. 3. It may
also be worthy of note that Governor Carey of New York was then involved in
a closely contested re-election campaign.
14. See Zimring, The Serios Juvenile Offender. Notes on an Unknown
Quantity, in THE SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER: PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM HELD IN MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA ON SEPTEMBER 19 AND 20,
1977 (1978).

15. See Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, in 1 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 82 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds.
1979).
16.
17.

Id
Id. Arrest statistics that form the basis of this assertion are reported

here. The waiver assumptions reflect the data reported in Joel P. Eigen, The
Borderlands of Juvenile Justice: The Waiver Process in Philadelphia
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
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Of course, if juvenile court is the wrong place to process
most young offenders, wholesale reduction in the court's delinquency jurisdiction can be justified. But reduction in jurisdictional age is too blunt an instrument to serve as an alternative
to waiver. Indeed, sweeping large numbers of juveniles into
criminal court would prompt the establishment within criminal
courts of institutions and patterns of decision-making that
resemble the contemporary juvenile court; in those circumstances, prosecutors and judges will make discretionary decisions about "exceptional cases" that might bear a disturbing
resemblance to waiver.
3.

Legislative Definition of Transfer Standards

In recent discussions of juvenile justice reform, much
energy has been devoted to reducing the inherent discretion
that currently characterizes transfer between juvenile and criminal court. Thie Juvenile Justice Standards attempt to restrict
the court's discretion by confining waiver to particularly serious
"Class 1" juvenile offenses and requiring, in addition, that the
accused juvenile have a "prior record of adjudicated delinquency involving the infliction or threat of significant bodily
injury. ' "' Even when both findings are made, the judge retains
the discretion not to transfer the juvenile under the
Standards. '
Professor Barry Feld produced an even more ambitious
proposal for Minnesota: his proposed legislative scheme would
make certain combinations of current charges and prior record
a sufficient condition for transfer to a criminal court, with only
one provision for "transfer back" to juvenile court.2 0
One cannot help but applaud efforts to create a rule of law
for such a critical decision. At the same time, it may be impossible to define in advance all those elements that should be
weighed in the decision to waive; and it is certainly unrealistic
to expect a legislature to approve (or long maintain) criteria as
restrictive as those recommended by the Standards or those
proposed by Professor Feld.
For example, under both the tentative Standards and the
proposed Minnesota legislation, two sixteen-year-olds currently charged with robbery and murder may be treated differ18. INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
&
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS:
STANDARDS
RELATING TO

TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS (1980), Standard 2.2-C.

19.
20.

Id.
See Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 617-18.
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ently if one has a prior adjudication for an offense against a
person and the other does not. Only the juvenile with the prior
adjudication can be waived under the Standards, and he or she
must be waived (if appropriately charged by the prosecutor)
under the Minnesota proposal. Will such schemes secure legislative approval? This is doubtful. When proposals of this kind
are introduced in legislative bodies, the list of "special crimes"
leading to waiver tend to expand substantially. Once such leg;
islation is passed, the most typical form of amendment is the
addition of new crimes to the list of those permitting or mandating waiver. Such expansion
did occur when Minnesota
21
adopted waiver guidelines.
It is also doubtful that we can remove discretion from
waiver decisions without multiplying several times over the
number of juvenile offenders transferred to criminal court.
Both the Standards and the proposed Minnesota statute hold a
prior record to be absolutely necessary for transfer to criminal
court to be considered. In Professor Feld's case, "a prior record of violence or crime is the best indicator of such behavior
in the future."22 The rationale for the approach in the Juvenile
Justice Standards is more opaque. But the typical legislative
approach to creating necessary conditions for transfer into
criminal court is deliberately overbroad because such standards
must be drafted to provide for the worst cases within any particular category. With respect to the prior record requirement,
the lawmaker must ask herself whether mass murder without
prior formal adjudication is a proper subject for a juvenile
court delinquency proceeding. If not, the need for a prior record will be deleted, either for all cases of homicide or by a separate provision for discretionary waiver in "exceptional cases."
A review of state legislation over the period 1970-1987
provides examples of both expanding the list of eligible felonies and of deleting requirements of waiver statutes. No state
has a waiver statute as restrictive as those proposed by either
Feld or the Standards."3 If legislative criteria for waiver are
overbroad because they are drafted with the worst cases in
mind, then attempts totally to rid the system of discretion will
inevitably lead to the transfer to criminal courts of large numbers ofjuvenile offenders who fall into the categories provided
by the legislation, even though their offenses and prior records
would not compel waiver in a discretionary system. A mechani21.

22.
23.

See Feld, supra note 4, at 506 (Table 1).
I at 497.
See id at 505-07 (Table 1).
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cal approach that requires transfer to criminal court whenever
possible would result in the transfer of many more cases than
in a system that retains discretion. Systems that attempt to
cope with this problem by providing judicial or prosecutorial
discretion to transfer back to juvenile court (a common "safety
valve to the safety valve") are no less discretionary because the
reference back occurs after a waiver decision. They simply
reallocate discretion, generally from a juvenile court judge to
prosecutors or criminal court judges. Discretion can be
removed only at the price of a rigidity that increases the punitive bite of legal policy toward youth crime.
The fact that legislation cannot specify a comprehensive
list of sufficient conditions for transfer to criminal court does
not excuse the absence of meaningful legislative guidance in
those circumstances in which transfer should be considered.
Legislation could and should list a very few crimes for which
transfer should be considered regardless of prior juvenile record: willful homicide, attempted murder, and aggravated rape
are my own short list for this category. Legislation can specify
a longer list of violent crimes for which a serious prior record
generates eligibility for waiver. All this is necessary but not sufficient. The ultimate decision must be made on a case-by-case
basis.
The foregoing discussion does not celebrate the unguided
discretion of juvenile court judges in making the waiver decision. Instead, it is suggested that some form of waiver policy
centered in the juvenile court may be preferable to those alternative schemes that are achievable in real-world settings. If
this is the case, the best recourse is to reform existing waiver
practices radically so that they meet minimum standards of
legality in a liberal democratic state.
II.

SOME STANDARDS FOR REFORM

A rule of law for exceptional cases is difficult to formulate,
impose, and regulate. But that does not excuse the currently
primitive doctrinal and procedural structure of discretionary
waiver. We have not failed to construct a legal structure for
waiver; failure implies unsuccessful effort, and most American
political subdivisions have devoted little serious effort to this
widely acknowledged problem.
This section argues, first, that a basic principle for making
the waiver decision can be derived from the justification for the
practice presented earlier in the article, and, second, that the

276

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA,

ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[VoL 5

problems identified above provide guidance toward appropriate reforms of waiver decisions and their consequences.
Essential elements of a coherent, defensible waiver policy
are:
1. A basic criterion for making the waiver judgment that
is consistent with the rationale for the juvenile court's
delinquency youth-serving mission;
2. A workable procedure for reviewing the discretionary
waiver decision; and
3. A punishment policy in criminal court which explicitly
recognizes that youth must be taken into account in
determining appropriate punishment.
1. A Basic Waiver Criterion
The list of goals we pursue in dealing with young offenders
in juvenile court is bewilderingly long. We wish to punish, but
also to mitigate the harshness of the punishment because of the
offender's immaturity. We undertake to supervise and to rehabilitate. We uphold privacy, seeking to protect the offender
from the stigma normally associated with criminal conviction.
Yet while the purposes of juvenile justice are many, the justification for waiver is singular: transfer to criminal court is necessary when the maximum punishment available in juvenile court
is clearly inadequate for a particular offender.
If this statement of the justification for waiver is correct, it
follows that the standard for making a waiver decision should
be a determination that the maximum social control available
in juvenile court falls far short of the minimum social control
necessary if a particular offender is guilty of the serious crime
he is charged with. Principal offenders accused of criminal
homicide, and a few repetitively violent offenders accused of
life-threatening crimes, will constitute the bulk of hard cases to
be measured against such a standard. 4 Accessories to
extremely serious crimes will represent the most troublesome
and novel problems for the implementation of such a standard
because of the special meaning and enormous statistical significance of group crime in early and middle adolescence. 5
Judgments about an offender's amenability to rehabilitation will play a relatively minor role in individual decisions
under this standard.26 For one thing, both juvenile and crimi24.

For an elaboration of this scheme, see Zimring, supra note 6, at 100-

25.

See generally Zimring, supra note 15, at 75-76.

26.

The "hard data" correlates of suitability for rehabilitation, prior

02.
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nal justice systems seek rehabilitation as one result of their
interventions. Moreover, such a nebulous standard usually
plays a minor role in decisions made about persons charged
with extremely serious offenses.
2.

Proceduresfor Review

The proposed standard of individualized waiver decisions
leaves enormous leeway for discretion, with all. its attendant
abuses. How can these be controlled? In the main, by appellate review of all waiver decisions.
This prescription is based on the assumption that predetermined standards for waiver that attempt precisely to delineate both necessary and sufficient conditions for transfer will
sweep too broadly. Judicial review, most properly by an appellate court with jurisdiction over criminal cases, should scrutinize the written opinions of the juvenile court judge and use
both principles and precedent in deciding whether waiver is
necessary. Admittedly, this is a costly, cumbersome, time-consuming process; however, appellate review of individual waiver
decisions is necessary for the evolution of a common law of
waiver, i.e. a set of principles and precedents elaborated by
appellate courts to guide individual juvenile court judges in
future cases. For this reason, every decision to transfer ajuvenile to a criminal court should generate an automatic right of
appeal." Given the long delays associated with careful appellate review and the overwhelming probability of pretrial custody in this class of cases, waived defendants should be
provided with the option either to appeal the waiver decision
before trial, or to raise the issue of the propriety of waiver after
conviction in criminal court.2 8 Collaterally, a guilty plea in
adjudication, prior institutionalization, and age are related to the waiver
patterns noted for homicide and robbery. See generally Eigen, supra note 17. It
appears much more fruitful to build any such criteria directly into a scheme of
decisionmaking rather than have them feed into the vaporous world of

amenability to treatment.
27. The single exception to the presupposition is transfer to criminal
court initiated by the motion of a juvenile represented by counsel. In many
jurisdictions, transfer mechanisms can be used by juvenile court defendants,
such as girls charged with prostitution, who are likely to receive more lenient
treatment in the criminal court system. That form of waiver, and the
transfers that occur solely because a juvenile offender is close to an age
boundary that has substantial administrative significance, are beyond the
scope of this discussion.
28. An alternative to this approach is found in the conjunction of
JuvenileJustice Standards, supra note 18, at §§ 2.4 and 2.4-B, which make the
proceeding interlocutory and mandate that it be speedy.
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criminal court should not void a juvenile's right to appeal his
transfer under this system.
There are a number of difficult issues surrounding the
standard for appellate review of waiver decisions and the
appropriate remedy when an appellate court finds that the
behavior alleged is insufficient to justify a transfer to the criminal courts that was made months or years before the appellate
court's opinion. While the standards for review and the consequences of reversal are, in theory, independent issues, they are
interrelated in practice because the consequences of reversal
will influence an appellate court's willingness to intrude.
Hence, the standard for review must be somewhat stricter than
the current practice of requiring the defendant to demonstrate
that the trial court. abused its "sound discretion."29 Particularly in the early years of appellate involvement, appellate
courts should exercise supervisory power over the principles to
be applied in waiver decisions while giving more deference to
findings of fact.
Appellate activism will produce a large number of cases in
which the proper remedy after reversal is not to return the
youth to juvenile court. It is likely, particularly with reconsideration of the waiver decision after criminal court conviction, that
appellate courts may decide that a waiver decision was inappropriate, but that the individual so affected is now far beyond the
age and setting suited to juvenile court processes and has
already served a number of years in adult penal facilities.
Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is not
remand to juvenile court but a reduction in sentence. While
such a procedure does not restore the defendant to the status
of a juvenile, it is consistent with the basic criterion proposed
for the administration of waiver and recognizes a continuity
between juvenile and adult corrections that appears realistic.
The procedures outlined above are inelegant but necessary. There is some degree of inconsistency in substantive
review of waiver decisions in a system that does not provide for
substantive appellate review of other sentencing decisions.
Preferably a broader right of appellate review of criminal
sentences should exist to resolve the inconsistency. It is also
untidy to provide for the postponement of a transfer appeal
until after resources have been invested in a determination of
guilt by the criminal court. However, less comprehensive
appellate review procedures would retard the evolution of principles and precedents necessary to rationalize waiver.
29.

See, e.g., People v. Clark, 119 I1l. 2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 138 (1987).
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Whether this approach should be supplemented with
administratively or judicially derived "guidelines" for waiver is
a tough question. Certainly, far more extensive studies of
waiver procedures and decisions should be undertaken.
Whether this information should be the nucleus of future policy guidelines is the test question for the desirability of administrative guidelines. If it is desirable to base future policy on
past practices, administrative guidelines can bejustified. If not,
the task of fashioning principles is more properly viewed as
judicial.
3.

Youth Crime Policy in Criminal Court

We come now to what may be the heart of the matter, the
step necessary to prevent waiver from becoming the capital
punishment ofjuvenile justice. The death penalty is inherently
inconsistent with the assumptions that underlie other interventions of criminal justice. But transfer to criminal court need
not contradict completely the assumptions that animate juvenile justice if the criminal courts give due regard to youth as a
factor in determining appropriate punishment.
A fifteen-year-old offender who is expelled from the juvenile court because of the seriousness of the allegations against
him remains fifteen years old. It would be ludicrous to argue
that the policy toward youth which so heavily influences the
proper outcome in other cases should be considered totally
irrelevant in those exceptional cases in which jurisdictional
transfer occurs.
Coherent waiver policy, thus, must extend beyond the
boundaries of juvenile justice. The appropriate sentence for
fifteen-year-olds and thirty-year-olds in criminal court is not
necessarily the same. At present, however, most states have no
explicit policy stipulating youth as a mitigating factor, and
those jurisdictions which have addressed the question in
"young offender legislation" use the rehabilitative models and
indeterminate sentences now out of fashion. 30 The trend
toward determinate sentences set by legislative or administrative bodies makes it even more necessary that in the formal
jurisprudence of criminal sentences, immaturity be given due
consideration.
There is more than a little irony in the fact that effective
reform of the waiver decision in juvenile court ultimately
depends on reform in the criminal court. The two systems are
30. A primary example is the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5005-5026 (1988). See generally Zimring, supra note 6, at 57-64.
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profoundly interdependent; the simultaneous reform of both
of them, however difficult, is essential if either system is to
achieve its purposes.
III.

CONCLUSION

Waiver appears to be a necessary evil in the interface
between juvenile justice and criminal justice in the United
States. A well-functioning juvenile justice system will transfer
only a tiny number of very serious offenders into the criminal
courts. Yet the legal policy toward this minority of young
offenders becomes a key test of the principles and practices of
the juvenile court.
If the selection processes within juvenile court for waiver
are not both fair and coherently explained, it is the whole of the
juvenile court's jurisprudence that is called into question.
Inadequate processes and principles in the criminal court may
distort even the best of decisions to waive in juvenile court.
Thus, legal policy toward the serious young offender requires
that significant attention be paid to what happens after a young
offender is waived. One of the most significant tests of the
juvenile justice system is the legal treatment of the system's
worst failures.

